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  ABSTRACT: The purpose of this paper is to focus our attention on the conceptual 
basis  upon  which  the  wealth  tax  system  may  be  implemented  in  Romania  taking  into 
consideration former and actual presence of wealth tax within Europe. The idea of increasing 
the taxable basis based on imposing the wealth constitutes one of the most important debate 
topics on the agenda of the Romanian Parliament and Government and also within specialists’ 
theoretical  approaches.  The  vast  range  of  such  approaches  and  further  solutions  is  to  be 
analysed in the global context of direct taxation in Europe and worldwide and particularly 
relevant for the complexity of the problem is the evolution of wealth tax during the last decades 
and also the very important context of moving corporate main offices in countries with more 
advantageous systems of taxation.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The starting point should be the assertion that “fiscal policy decisions reflect 
the  related  tax  system  and  ensure  its  functionality  in  order  to  obtain  the  aimed 
economic effects” (Dobrota & Chirculescu, p.207-213). In the specific condition of 
worldwide  economic  downturn,  Romania  has  also  faced  new  challenges  in  finding 
various solutions and  designing fiscal and budgetary scenarious  in respect of fiscal 
policy and budget policy that may lead to limit the effects of economic and financial 
crisis. 
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Some  economists  agree  that  most  taxes  distort  economic  behaviour,  which 
leads to reduced economic efficiency and hence reduced economic output. Under these 
circumstances the analysis in respect of wealth tax reveals that it has a negative impact 
in economic growth in a number of ways. But first of all it is important to define the 
concept of wealth, generally defined as a direct tax imposed on the wealth possessed 
by  individuals,  but  usually  finding  various  meanings  and  understandings  in  each 
country taking into consideration the different tax policy and fiscal environment. 
 
2. WEALTH TAX CONCEPT IN THE ECONOMIC LITERATURE 
 
According with the finance and business dictionary wealth tax is defined as: 
“tax on accumulated wealth a tax on somebody's accumulated wealth, as opposed to 
their income” (available on http://www.qfinance.com/dictionary/wealth-tax). Another 
definition positioned the wealth tax as a tax which is levied on the wealth held by a 
person or entity and being mostly levied on net worth, i.e. the amount of someone's 
wealth minus his or her debts. Several nations all around the world use the wealth tax 
to raise funds for the  government, using  various types  of  wealth taxes and taxable 
basis. 
A wealth tax is generally conceived of as a levy based on the aggregate value 
of all household holdings actually accumulated as purchasing power stock, cash, bank 
deposits, money funds, and savings in insurance and pension plans, investment in real 
estate  and  unincorporated  businesses,  and  corporate  stock,  financial  securities  and 
personal trusts. Net wealth tax can be distinguished from property taxes due to the fact 
that property taxes are imposed on the gross amount of property, without any reduction 
for debts and usually are imposed only on certain kinds of property, while net wealth 
tax is a more or less comprehensive tax on net worth, i.e. the value of property reduced 
by debt (Thuronyi, 2003, p.329). 
What it is very important to first define is that the wealth tax is a tax not on 
income but  on assets, i.e. that the taxable basis  will vary  from country to  country 
according with the fiscal policy and taxable revenue based-interest, as follows: taxes 
on premises, houses, real estate properties, cars, art collections, jewellery, stocks and 
bonds, bank accounts, pensions, investments, companies owned in whole or in part and 
the taxable persons may be individuals or corporate persons (the example of India).  
Another characteristic revealed by the economic studies has enhanced on one 
hand the fact that most of the governments levying this net worth tax are advanced 
welfare states with a relatively high government spending to GDP rate. (France, India) 
and on the other hand the long-term trend in wealth-tax receipts as a share of total taxes 
and  of  GDP  has  generally  been  downward  or  constant  in  many  of  these  countries 
(Hansson, 2002). 
Most of the countries apply in the field of direct taxation only the property 
taxes on the market value of real estate assessed almost by the local tax authorities, 
because  they  rely  upon  the  fact  that  real  estate  cannot  be  moved  out  of  another 
jurisdiction,  whereas  income,  paper  wealth,  etc.  are  more  easily  moved  to  other 
localities where they may be taxed less or not at all. In comparison with wealth tax 
apply to other assets than real estate properties, it was in many areas demonstrated that  
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real estate tax revenues can be a very effective way to raise large sums of money, as 
people who hold valuable real estate investments can owe substantial property taxes 
annually. In regions where overall real estate values are high, property tax revenues 
provide a great deal of revenue to local governments. 
 
3. EXISTING WEALTH TAXES WITHIN EUROPE 
 
France is the only EU country to impose a standard wealth tax model since 
1981.  In  the  continent  of  Europe,  Norway  and  Lichtenstein  have  versions  of  it, 
Switzerland  levies  at  cantonal  level  at  variable,  mostly  low  levels,  Hungary  start 
implementing it since 1
st January 2010 and Spain wants to reintroduce it since mid 
2010.  Several  countries  have  abolished  their  versions  of  the  tax  in  recent  years, 
including Austria (1994), Denmark, Germany (1997), The Netherlands (2001), Iceland 
(2006), Finland (2006), Sweden (2007) and Greece (2009). Others countries, including 
Britain and  Belgium,  have  never  had such a tax, although the similar concept was 
implemented  through  the  Window  Tax  of  1696  (tax  introduced  under  the  Act  of 
Making Good the Deficiency of the Clipped Money in 1696 under King William III, 
designed to impose the prosperity of the taxpayers).  
Italy offers another pattern of possible wealth tax philosophy implementation, 
such as a limited temporary application form 1992 from the next 3 years. Officially 
wealth tax was abolished a few years later (1998) (Heckly’s, 2004, pp. 39-50). 
  In case of Spain the government abolished in 2008 a wealth tax that charged 
0.2 to 2.5 percent on assets above 600,000 Euros, amounted a general impact in the 
annual state revenues to 2 billion Euros (around 0.2 percent of GDP), but Spain’s 
Socialist government will impose a new tax on the wealthy mid 2010 broadening its 
deficit-cutting campaign to 3% of the GDP in 2013 from 11.2% in 2009, after unions 
threatened a  general strike to protest against austerity  measures. This  new tax will 
affect (according with the Spain Prime Minister Luis Rodriguez Zapatero debates in 
the  Parliament)  only  people  with”  high-economic  capacity”  and  “it  won’t  affect 
general taxes and it won’t affect 99.9% of the Spanish population”. 
  France. Individuals resident in France and non-residents with assets in France 
are taxed on the basis of their assets in excess of 790.000 euro (Starting with 2009) as 
at 1 January each year applying the wealth tax known as ISF (Impot de Solidarité sur 
la  Fortune).  This  direct  was  one  of  the  Socialist  Party’s  1981  electoral  program’s 
measures,  titled  110  Propositions  for  France  and  has  represented  in  2006  approx. 
1,28% from the general state budget revenues, i.e. 3,68 billion Euro collected from the 
taxpayer. 
Residents are liable to wealth tax on their net worldwide assets including all 
properties,  subject  to  the  provisions  of  tax  treaties,  based  on  the  wealth  of  the 
household, including spouse and infant children. Taxable assets include: real estate, 
cars, other vehicles, debts due to you, furniture (except antiques), horses, jewellery, 
shares, bonds and the redemption value of any life assurance, but there are also exempt 
assets, such as: those necessary to a business conducted by its owner or their spouse; 
pictures, tapestries, statues, sculptures, lithographs, antiques over 100 years old,  funds  
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in  a  pension  fund  constituted  in  respect  of  an  employment  or  business,  subject  to 
certain conditions and also portfolio investments and cash held by non-residents.  
A new law was enacted on 6 August 2008 exempting the non-French assets of 
anyone arriving in France after that date for five years, provided that they were not 
resident in France at any point during the five years prior to their arrival in France. 
 
Table 1. French Wealth Tax Bands 2010 
 
Fraction Taxable  Rate of Tax (%) 
Up to €790,000  0 
€790,000 - €1,290,000  0.55 
€1,290,000 - €2,530,000  0.75 
€2,530,000 - €3,980,000  1.00 
€3,980,000 - €7,600,000  1.30 
€7,600,000 - €16,540,000  1.65 
Over €16,540,000  1.80 
Source: http://www.french-property.com/guides/france/finance-taxation/taxation/wealth-tax/rate/ 
 
  Norway. The tax qouta is up to 0.7% (municipal) and 0.4% (national) and 
represents a percentage of 1,1% levied on net assets exceeding Nkr. 470,000. 
  Liechtenstein.  Net  worth  tax  is  charged  on  the  net  assets  of  the  taxpayer: 
assets, securities, cash, deposits and valuables at a maximum rate of 0.9%. Liabilities, 
such as mortgages and loans are deducted and assets and liabilities are taken in at fair 
market value. 
  Switzerland. Individuals are subject to an annual wealth tax in all cantons 
(political regions) and communities and no wealth tax is levied at federal level. Wealth 
tax  is  levied  on  the  entire  wealth  of  a  tax  liable  individual  i.e.,  all  movable  and 
immovable assets, rights and claims of monetary value, securities, participations, etc. 
but household effects and articles of personal use are exempted. Wealth tax should not 
decrease the net wealth of an individual, but indirectly tax the income deriving from 
this wealth. Wealth tax can thus be understood as a tax amending income tax. 
Tax resident individuals are subject to wealth tax on their world wide assets. 
Non-resident  individuals  are  liable  to  wealth  tax  only  for  assets  closely  linked  to 
Switzerland (i.e., for real estate and permanent establishments located in Switzerland, 
but not for securities deposited on a Swiss bank account or participations held in a 
Swiss company). Even though the tax liability of non-residents is reduced on assets 
linked to Switzerland, the progressive tax rate is always determined on the basis of an 
individual’s  worldwide  wealth. The tax payable varies between cantons to cantons. 
Subject to slightly differing cantonal regulations the amount of gross assets is reduced 
by the underlying debt so that only an individual’s net wealth is taxed.  
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In general, all assets are evaluated at their fair market value. Some assets are, 
however,  subject  to  specific  valuation  rules  (e.g.,  participations  in  stock  quoted 
companies  are  usually  evaluated  at  their  stock  price  at  the  end  of  the  tax  period 
whereas for non quoted securities estimated values determined according to published 
valuation regulations apply). The annual wealth tax stands at approximately 1.5% in 
many cases. In  most cantons tax rates follow a progressive scale. The base rate is 
determined  in  the  cantonal  tax  law.  The  amount  of  wealth  tax  is  computed  by 
multiplying  the  individual’s  net  wealth  with  this  base  rate  and  subsequently 
multiplying the result with the cantonal and communal tax multipliers as published on 
a yearly basis. 
  Luxembourg. The net worth tax in Luxembourg is known as the Fortune Tax 
and is levied on resident and non-resident corporate entities. For businesses, the two 
main components of Net Worth are Real Estate Unitary Value and Business Net Worth 
which is an adjusted version of net worth as calculated for the Corporate Income Tax. 
The rate of tax is 0.5%. However, for most companies the amount of Fortune Tax 
payable is offsettable against Corporate Income Tax, subject to some balance sheet 
reserve requirements. 
  Hungary. Wealth tax has been introduced in Hungary as of January 1, 2010 
having as main target the governmental needs to meet budget deficit targets attached to 
the  country’s  International  Monetary  Fund-led  bailout.  The  taxable  basis  was 
established as follows: real estate, watercraft, aircraft and high-powered automobiles. 
Due to the fact that the law fails to provide clear guidelines to determine the  property’s 
market value as the taxable basis the regulation in case of wealth tax for high-value 
real estate  have been struck down by the Constitutional Court and only a tax on high-
value yachts, planes and helicopters and cars has been finally confirmed. Wealth tax 
advance should be paid by May 20, 2010 and September 30, 2010 and the wealth tax 
return deadline is the personal income tax return submission deadline of the related tax 
year (i.e. the 2010 wealth tax should be reported by May 20, 2010, as an attachment to 
the personal income tax return).   
 
4. SOME REASONS OF THE WEALTH TAX DECLINE IN EUROPE 
 
One of the most recent examples of wealth tax being abolished is that of The 
Netherlands, under the 2001 General Tax Reform. However, while the wealth tax was 
removed, it was just as soon replaced by a 30% tax on theoretical revenue on capital, 
assumed  to  equal  4%  of  net  assets  (excluding  main  place  of  residence  and  capital 
invested in personal enterprise). As a result, wealth tax there stands at 1.2%; at the 
same time, actual revenue on capital (interests and dividends) is fully exempt. That 
being said, it is admittedly too early to assess the impact of the said reform. 
In other countries, such as Finland and Norway, where wealth tax still applies, 
it has been criticised, though it seems unlikely that it will be done away with in the 
near future. To wit, Norway’s Skauge Committee recommended, in a report on tax 
reform handed in to the government in February 2003 that the tax be cut in half and, in 
the longer term, done away with entirely. However, the prospect of such a measure 
stirred negative reactions in public opinion.  
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France, too, is familiar with beating around the wealth tax bush: removed by 
the Chirac government in 1986, the tax was re-established by the Rocard government 
in  1989,  under  a  new  name  –  perhaps  drawing  on  the  solidarity-based  capital  tax, 
which had been temporarily instituted by the 15 August 1945 Order. 
The  scientific  literature  has  surprised  some  reasons  why  wealth  tax  was 
abolished in some European countries, as follows: 
- It contributes to capital drain. This is the factor that most influenced the Irish 
and Dutch  governments, when they decided to  do away  with the tax. As they  had 
realised, it had a harmful effect on the country’s economic activity, causing productive 
capital to leave and discouraging foreign investors from coming in. In contrast, the 
desire to prevent capital drain was less a factor for Austria. This could, admittedly, be 
due to the country’s banking and tax system, which is attractive to investors. The same 
is true of Germany, where capital drain played a secondary part, the decisive factor 
being the Constitutional Court’s decision, and the cost-return ratio observed. 
-  It  entails  high  management  costs  yet  low  returns.  In  this  age  of  fiscal 
competition, governments and authorities also need to be competitive and have shown 
a clear preference for modern taxes with high yield, as in VAT or France’s CSG. The 
complexity of wealth tax is such that a large number of civil servants are required, to 
perform the checks, when it rarely yields more than 1% of total tax income in most 
countries. It is that complexity which, as early as 1976, made the Germany’s Union 
Fiscal  Civil  Servants  demands  the  abolition  of  wealth  tax.  In  Austria  too,  the 
complexity and lack  of clarity around the tax played a  decisive part in bringing  it 
down. In The Netherlands, a comparative study listed the various taxes by management 
cost (cost of tax collection for the government and costs borne by taxpayers to come in 
compliance with tax legislation), compared to the revenue brought in: the aggregated 
cost (those borne by taxpayers, on the one hand, and by the government, on the other) 
amounted to 26.4% of the tax’s yield, as compared to 4.8% with income tax. 
- It distorts resource allocation. In Germany and Austria alike, the wealth tax 
was levied both on corporate capital and individual wealth. As a result, companies and 
shareholders  were  hit  with  double  taxation.  While  it  would,  admittedly,  have  been 
possible  to  remedy  that  by  limiting  taxation  to  individual  wealth,  this  would  have 
brought about a degree of fiscal discrimination against individual enterprises, which 
would have remained subject to tax. The tax system would thus not have remained 
neutral as regards corporate taxation. It is true that the German tax authorities might 
also have exonerated working equipment, as France had done, but given the tax’s high 
collection cost, they did not wish to reduce its yield further. 
Imbalances can also arise in how savings are spread between the various types 
of  assets,  given  that  some  of  them  are  exempt  from  tax.  In  Finland,  for  instance, 
checking accounts, savings accounts and certain types of bonds (in particular those 
where an automatic deduction is taken on interests, at the source) are all tax exempt. 
Moreover, since real estate there is under-valued, the Finnish wealth tax is by no means 
neutral regarding how various investments should be carried out. In Germany, such 
distortion  is  even  more  noticeable,  hence  the  Constitutional  Court’s  decision.  The 
various types of assets were not given equal treatment. Real estate was considerably 
under-valued, as the official taxation bases used were, for the most part, those of 1964.  
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For instance, it was estimated that the land’s official value was around 50% that of 
market  value,  the  value  of  farming  and  forestry  properties  only  10%  and  that  of 
unlisted corporate shares only 35%. In contrast, listed securities and financial assets 
cannot  be  undervalued.  Thus,  while  Germany’s  wealth  tax  creates  economic 
distortions, it is also inequitable, and it is that aspect, above all, that the Constitutional 
Court sought to condemn. 
- Wealth tax is not as equitable as it appears. This is probably the most serious 
criticism under which the tax can fall, as it was precisely in order to ensure equity that 
it  was instituted. To  witness,  in France, the fact that the solidarity  wealth tax was 
instituted at approximately the same time as the subsidised minimum mainstreaming 
income (RMI) is highly symbolic: the total yield from the former was approximately 
equal to the total cost of RMI, as though the wealthiest people were coming out to help 
the  least  privileged  populations.  However,  it  has  to  be  recognised  that,  in  most 
industrialised countries, disparities in income and estate have considerably increased 
over the  last twenty  years, despite the  existence  of  wealth tax. Inheritance tax has 
probably been more effective in re-distributing resources than annual wealth tax, in 
that  the  latter  would  need  to  be  confiscatory  in  order  to  bring  about  any  real 
redistribution. This is exactly what the Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe stated when it 
criticised German wealth tax: that the sum of wealth tax and income tax should not be 
greater than half of a taxpayer’s income. The tax thus gives rise to a dilemma: either it 
is effective in fighting inequalities, or it is confiscatory – and it is for that reason that 
the Germans chose to eliminate it. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
  Despite  recent  debates  in  the  political  arenas  of  a  number  of  European 
countries in the wide context of the economic downturn, there has been little empirical 
study  of  the  relationship  between  the  wealth  tax  and  economic  performance.  In 
Romania there  was a recent  legislative  initiative that sets the  proposal to  levy an 
annual quota of  0.5% affecting people net wealth over 500,000 euros, considering the 
family's wealth, including spouse and their underage children. 
  The taxable basis should have been real estate goods and properties, financial 
rights  and  values  belonging  to  the  individual,  his/her  spouse  and  their  children 
(underage) in the case they administrate the individual's goods. The law project also 
sees that resident individuals should pay an annual duty for net patrimony owned in 
Romania  and  overseas,  while  non-residents  pay  for  the  net  patrimony  owned  in 
Romania, on condition that the international convention addressing double taxation is 
respected.  
  Using  the  information  presented  above  our  assumption  is  that  in  case  of 
Romania the advantages of levy the wealth tax over the fiscal benefits (increasing the 
state  revenues  in  the  near  future  and  also  in  a  mid  and  long  perspective)  are  not 
material. The arguments in favor of wealth tax are less than the arguments against the 
wealth  tax  and  therefore  the  Romanian  government  should  take  into  consideration 
these assumptions.  
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  Even  if  the  wealth  tax  would  generate  revenues,  which  could  be  used  to 
decrease the national debt, on the other hand the same wealth tax would generally incur 
high  management  costs,  for  both  the  taxpayer  and  the  administrating  authorities, 
compared to other taxes.  
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